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Under the standard account ofjudicial behavior when a panel ofappellate court judges
cannot agree on the outcome of a case, the panel has two options. First, it can publish a
divided decision with a majority opinion and a dissent. Panels usually do not take this route
because a dissent dramatically increases the probability of reversal. The second and more
common option is for the panel to bargain and compromise over the reasoning of the decision
and then publish a unanimous opinion.
This Article argues that a divided panel has a third option: strategic publication. The
panel can choose not to publish any opinion at all and thus sap its decision of precedential
weight and insulate it from further scrutiny by higher courts. This Article also reports the
results of a novel empirical analysis of case-level data on published and unpublished ecisions
in one federal circuit court. While it finds little empirical evidence that majority-Democrat
panels in the sample engage in strategic publication, itfinds evidence that majority-Republican
panels do. The Article concludes by offering several policy proposals to diminish strategic
publication by separating the publication decision from judicial negotiations over the merits.
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I. INTRODUCTION
At Justice Sotomayor's confirmation hearings, her most
controversial judicial opinion was a one-page summary order. Certain
senators objected to the outcome of the case. Others objected to its
reasoning. But what really bothered people was that it was an
unpublished summary order.,
Indeed, Ricci v. DeStefano had once appeared likely to produce
an important published ecision. White firefighters sued the City of
New Haven for throwing out the results of a promotional exam due to
racial disparities.2 The District Court ruled in favor of the city in a
lengthy opinion.3 On appeal to the Second Circuit, the case was
assigned to a merits panel consisting of Sotomayor and two other
judges. The parties submitted over 100 pages of briefs and 1800
pages of appendices, two groups filed amicus briefs, and the oral
argument lasted over an hour.4 And the case raised novel and
important constitutional questions about the role of race in
government hiring decisions5
Yet, a few months after oral argument, the panel issued an
unpublished summary order that devoted just 162 words to deciding
the case. The panel explained that it was affirming "substantially for
1. See, e.g., Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination ofHon. Sonia Sotomayor, to
be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 91 (2010) [hereinafter Confirmation Hearing]. During questioning,
Senator Hatch stated, "I am very concerned about [Ricci] because of a variety of reasons ....
[I]t was a summary [order], meaning it didn't have to be distributed to the other judges on the
Court." Id. Similarly, Senator Comyn stated, "I was shocked to see the sort of treatment that
the three-judge panel you served on gave to the claims of these firefighters by an unpublished
summary order." Id. at 331.
2. Ricci v. DeStefano, 530 F.3d 88, 94-95 (2d Cir. 2008) (Cabranes, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc).
3. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 554 F. Supp. 2d 142 (D. Conn. 2006).
4. Ricci, 530 F.3d at 95-96 (Cabranes, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en
banc).
5. See id. at 94-96.
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the reasons stated" by the court below.6 Because unpublished
decisions do not establish binding precedent7 and are typically
reserved for well-settled questions of law, they almost never receive
further judicial scrutiny8
Not so here. First, by chance, Second Circuit Judge Jose
Cabranes read about the summary order in a local newspaper and then
requested a vote for rehearing en banc by the entire court.9 Cabranes
narrowly lost-seven votes to six.10 His blistering dissent, which was
signed by all the other judges on his side, excoriated the panel for
resolving the case by summary order." Second, a few months later,
the United States Supreme Court granted the plaintiffs' petition for
certiorari and reversed.12 This outcome is rare in cases disposed by an
unpublished opinion and only reinforces the oddity of resolving Ricci
by summary order.13
What explains the behavior of Sotomayor and the rest of the
panel? Why did they issue a summary order in such an important
case? For her part, Sotomayor has denied any funny business, stating
6. Ricci v. DeStefano, 264 Fed. App'x 106, 107 (2d. Cir. 2008) ("We affirm,
substantially for the reasons tated in the thorough, thoughtful, and well-reasoned opinion of
the court below.").
7. 2D CIR. R. 32.1.1(a).
8. See Penelope Pether, Inequitable Injunctions: The Scandal ofPrivate Judging in
the U.S. Courts, 56 STAN. L. REv. 1435, 1441, 1483-86 (2004) (arguing that unpublished
opinions insulate judicial decisions from Supreme Court review); William L. Reynolds &
William M. Richman, The Non-Precedential Precedent-Limited Publication and No-
Citation Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals, 78 CoLuM. L. REv. 1167, 1202-03
(1978) (explaining that the Supreme Court is unlikely to review decisions with no
precedential value); Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric:
Judicial Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 1371, 1374 (1995) [hereinafter Wald, Rhetoric of
Results] ("I have even seen wily would-be dissenters go along with a result they do not like
so long as it is not elevated to a precedent. We do occasionally sweep troublesome issues
under the rug. ); Patricia M. Wald, Changing Course: The Use of Precedent in the
District of Columbia Circuit, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 477, 500-01 (1986) [hereinafter Wald,
Changing Course] (noting that unpublished opinions are "rarely en banced").
9. Stuart Taylor Jr., How Ricci Almost Disappeared, NAT'L J.: NINTH JUST. (July 10,
2009, 6:30 PM), http://archive.1i/2I4SY. After the vote, the three-judge panel withdrew its
summary order and filed a published per curiam opinion with similar language. Ricci, 530
F.3d at 88. That opinion had the effect of establishing the district court's decision as binding
Second Circuit precedent.
10. Ricci, 530 F.3d at 88.
11. See, e.g., id. at 101 ("[The panel] failed to grapple with the questions of
exceptional importance raised in this appeal.").
12. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 593 (2009).
13. See Ryan C. Black & Ryan J. Owens, Agenda Setting in the Supreme Court: The
Collision of Policy and Jurisprudence, 71 J. PoL. 1062, 1071 (2009) (providing empirical
evidence that the Supreme Court is less likely to grant certiorari in lower court cases disposed
by unpublished opinions).
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that the legal questions in Ricci were fully answered by prior Second
Circuit precedent.14
But others disagreed. The New York Times reported that the
panel "had difficulty finding consensus" and ultimately "agreed to use
a summary order rather than a full decision in an effort to find
common ground."15 If so, the panel may have breached the Second
Circuit's internal operating procedures, which only permit summary
orders when the "decision in a case is unanimous and each panel
judge believes that no jurisprudential purpose is served by an
opinion."16 Cabranes' dissent went a step further, implying that the
panel was trying to bury the case to insulate it from further judicial
scrutiny17 At the confirmation hearings, some members of the Senate
Judiciary Committee raised the same concerns.18
The use of a summary order in Ricci maps poorly onto the
conventional understanding of judicial behavior. Under the standard
account, a panel that disagrees about the reasoning or outcome of a
case has two options.19 First, it can file a divided decision with a
majority opinion and dissent. Scholars of judicial behavior have
observed that panels usually do not take this route because dissenters
serve as "whistleblowers,"20 dramatically increasing the probability of
14. Sotomayor signed onto Judge Katzmann's concurrence to the denial of rehearing
en banc, which stated that legal questions in Ricci were resolved by "controlling authority" in
the Second Circuit. Ricci, 530 F.3d at 90.
15. Adam Liptak, New Scrutiny of Judge's Most Controversial Case, N.Y. TIMES
(June 5, 2009), https://nyti.ms/2BvccmC.
16. 2D CIR. I.O.P. 32.1.1(a); see also Taylor, supra note 9 (stating that "it might be
difficult to square the panel's action" with the local rules).
17. See Ricci, 530 F.3d at 101 ("It is arguable that when an appeal raising novel
questions of constitutional and statutory law is resolved by an opinion that tersely adopts the
reasoning of a lower court-and does so without further legal analysis or even a full
statement of the questions raised on appeal-those questions are insulated from further
judicial review."); see also William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, An Evaluation of
Limited Publication in the United States Courts ofAppeals: The Price ofReform, 48 U. CM.
L. REV. 573, 581 (1981) ("If '[slunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants,' then limited
publication may permit sores to fester." (alteration in original) (quoting LoUIS D. BRANDEIS,
OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914)).
18. Senator Comyn noted that he was "shocked" by the summary order at least
partially because it was unlikely "to be reviewed or even caught by other judges on the
Second Circuit." Confirmation Hearing, supra note 1, at 331. Sotomayor's response clearly
shows she understood the implication, explaining that "addressing an issue by summary
order ... doesn't hide a party's claims from other judges.... [S]o regardless of how a circuit
decide[s] a case, it's not a question of hiding it from others." Id. at 332.
19. See Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to
Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155,
2169-70 (1998) (developing the whistleblower theory).
20. See id. at 2158-62.
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reversal.21 They also increase the time and resources required to write
the majority opinion, which typically responds to the dissent's
objections.22 Thus, under the standard account, the second and more
common option is for the panel to negotiate and compromise over the
reasoning of the decision and then publish one unanimous opinion.23
This Article argues that a divided panel has a third option, which
I call strategic publication: as in Ricci, it can choose not to publish
any opinion at all and thus sap its decision of precedential weight.
Indeed, some circuit court judges may care more about precedent han
about the outcome of the particular case before them. When the
judges cannot reach a compromise, they may exchange precedent for
unanimity.
Of course, if Ricci were just a one-off case, then strategic
publication would be little more than a political curiosity. But this
Article presents empirical evidence that it isn't. Judges may engage in
the practice quite frequently.
Using case-level data from the Third Circuit, I apply a standard
methodological approach and compare outcomes-in this case,
whether a decision is published-across judicial panels with different
ideological compositions.24 While I find little evidence that majority-
Democrat panels in the Third Circuit engage in strategic publication, I
find significant evidence that majority-Republican panels do.25
Indeed, panels with three Republican judges publish substantially
more often-43% more-than panels with two Republicans and one
21. See Tracey E. George, The Dynamics and Determinants of the Decision to Grant
En Banc Review, 74 WASH. L. REV. 213, 267 (1999) (reporting that the odds of reversal for
circuit court opinions with a dissent were thirty-nine times higher than for unanimous
opinions).
22. See Lee Epstein et al., Why (and When) Judges Dissent: A Theoretical and
Empirical Analysis, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSis 101, 102 (2011) (finding that majority opinions
accompanied by a dissent are 20% longer).
23. See Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 25-29 (2008); Cross & Tiller, supra note 19, at 2170-72; see also Ryan C.
Black & Ryan J. Owens, Bargaining and Legal Development in the United States Courts of
Appeals, 41 Am. POL. RES. 1071, 1083-93 (2013) (examining how frequently judges request
changes to a draft opinion authored by another panel member and how frequently the
authoring judge accepts the change).
24. See, e.g., Cox & Miles, supra note 23, at 18-29 (examining the effect of panel
ideology on case outcomes); Cross & Tiller, supra note 19, at 2169-70; Thomas J. Miles &
Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of
Chevron, 73 U. Cm. L. REv. 823, 829-69 (2006); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental
Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 1751-56 (1997).
25. For ease of reference, I refer to judges appointed by Democratic presidents as
"Democratic judges" and judges appointed by Republican presidents as "Republican judges."
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Democrat. These results are consistent with the practice of strategic
publication.26
Due to the large sample size of my dataset, I also improve on
prior research designs by examining the behavior of individual judges
across different panel compositions. The judge-specific analysis
confirms my primary results: many Republican judges in the Third
Circuit publish far less frequently when sitting on a panel with one
Democrat than when sitting with no Democrats.
What explains the political asymmetry in the results? While I
lack the data to probe this question empirically, I suggest that the
whistleblower effect of a potential dissenter may be diminished when
the ideology of the en banc court is similar to that of the panel
majority such that the en banc court is unlikely to reverse.27 Majority-
Democrat panels in the data may not have engaged in strategic
publication because Democrats held a majority of the active seats in
the Third Circuit for nearly all of the study period.28
Strategic publication has several important normative
implications. First, it reinforces existing fears that unpublished
opinions may impair judicial accountability. The standard criticisms
of unpublished opinions are that they insulate poor decisions from
reversal29 and that judges are unable to apply the standards of
publication consistently.30 If judges engage in strategic publication
then the status quo may be even worse: they may sometimes issue an
26. See infra Part V.A.
27. See Pauline T. Kim, Deliberation and Strategy on the United States Courts of
Appeals: An Empirical Exploration of Panel Effects, 157 U. PA. L. REv. 1319, 1334-35
(2009) (finding that circuit court decisions are influenced by the distance between the
ideology of a circuit panel and the en banc court).
28. There are good reasons to expect that the en banc court casts a darker shadow on
this process than the Supreme Court. See discussion infra Part VI.
29. See Pether, supra note 8, at 1441, 1483-86 (arguing that unpublished opinions
"imperil the legitimacy of the judicial system"); Reynolds & Richman, supra note 8, at 1202-
03 (arguing that "limited publication/no-citation regimes significantly diminish the
accountability" of circuit court panels to the Supreme Court, en banc courts, and the public).
30. Donald R. Songer et al., Nonpublication in the Eleventh Circuit: An Empirical
Analysis, 16 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 963, 975-80 (1989) (finding based on an empirical analysis
of the Eleventh Circuit cases that judges apply the publication criteria inconsistently); Wald,
Rhetoric of Results, supra note 8, at 1374 ("[I]n my experience the criteria are vague and
infinitely maneuverable. In a study of the D.C. Circuit's unpublished decisions several years
ago, a bar committee ... questioned the decision not to publish in 40 percent of the cases.");
see also Marin K. Levy, Judicial Attention as a Scarce Resource: A Preliminary Defense of
How Judges Allocate Time Across Cases in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 81 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 401, 420-22 (2013) (cataloguing scholarly arguments that concerns raised by
unpublished opinions are exacerbated by other case management practices, including
delegation to clerks and staff attorneys).
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unpublished opinion precisely because it insulates the decision from
reversal and because the decision meets the criteria for publication.31
Second, strategic publication may polarize circuit precedent. If
diverse panels publish fewer decisions on controversial legal issues,
then those issues will be decided disproportionately by homogeneous
panels, which are more likely to write ideologically extreme opinions.
In other words, strategic publication may hollow out the moderate
voice.
To address these potential problems, I offer several policy
proposals that would push the publication decision to earlier phases in
the appellate process, before a panel has the chance to discuss and
vote on the merits of its cases. For example, many circuits use
screening panels to identify which cases require oral argument.32
Cases that do are assigned to full merits panels for adjudication. To
diminish strategic publication, the circuit courts could enact local
rules requiring screening panels to also decide which cases require a
published opinion. This procedure would remove publication from
the bargaining table when panels negotiate over the outcome and
reasoning of their decisions.
Strategic publication also has important theoretical implications
for our understanding of judicial behavior. One of the most
widespread empirical findings in the literature is that diverse panels
write more moderate published opinions.33 As a result, many scholars
31. See, e.g., Plumley v. Austin, 135 S. Ct. 828, 831 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) ("It is hard to imagine a reason that the Court of Appeals would not
have published this opinion except to avoid creating binding law for the Circuit."); Wald,
Rhetoric ofResults, supra note 8, at 1374 ("I have seen judges purposely compromise on an
unpublished decision incorporating an agreed-upon result in order to avoid a time-consuming
public debate about what law controls. I have even seen wily would-be dissenters go along
with a result they do not like so long as it is not elevated to a precedent."); see also Richard S.
Arnold, Unpublished Opinions: A Comment, I J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 219, 223 (1999)
("If.. . a precedent is cited, and the other side then offers a distinction, and the judges on the
panel cannot think of a good answer to the distinction, but nevertheless, for some extraneous
reason, wish to reject it, they can easily do so through the device of an abbreviated,
unpublished opinion, and no one will ever be the wiser.... Or if, after hearing argument, a
judge in conference thinks that a certain decision should be reached, but also believes that the
decision is hard to justify under the law, he or she can achieve the result, assuming agreement
by the other members of the panel, by deciding the case in an unpublished opinion and
sweeping the difficulties under the rug.").
32. See, e.g., LAURAL HOOPER ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., CASE MANAGEMENT
PROCEDURES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS 19, 64, 89, 110-11, 166, 173, 187, 190,
203-05 (2d ed. 2011) (describing oral argument screening panels in the First, Third, Fifth,
Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits).
33. See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES 191 (2013) ("Confirming the earlier empirical literature, we
find that the presence on a panel of a judge appointed by a President of a different party from
that of the President (or Presidents) who appointed the other judges on the panel tends to
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have concluded that diversity produces moderated reasoning, either by
changing how panel members view their cases or by incentivizing
strategic bargaining over reasoning.34 Strategic publication calls that
interpretation into question, suggesting that he correlation between
panel composition and reasoning may represent selection, not
causation. If judges engage in strategic publication, then published
opinions issued by diverse panels may be moderate not because
diversity moderates reasoning but because some ideologically
extreme decisions are issued in unpublished opinions, which are
excluded from most empirical work on judicial behavior.35
This selection process also has methodological implications for
empirical research on judicial behavior. For decades, scholars
believed that, at least in some circuits, it was "harmless to ignore
unpublished opinions, simply because they [were] easy."36 Strategic
publication suggests that it is a mistake to ignore unpublished
decisions, particularly when examining voting behavior.37
moderate the voting of those judges."); Cox & Miles, supra note 23, at 25-29; Miles &
Sunstein, supra note 24, at 853-54, 863-65; Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Trading Votes
for Reasoning: Covering in Judicial Opinions, 81 S. CAL. L. REv. 735, 739-40 (2008)
(finding that mixed panels produce more moderate decisions); Cross & Tiller, supra note 19,
at 2170-72.
34. See Cox & Miles, supra note 23, at 36 ("[W]hy might a white judge vote
differently when he sits with an African-American judge in a section 2 case? One possibility
is that the white judge's sincere view of the merits of the case changes when he deliberates
with an African-American judge.... Strategic behavior is a possibility here as well."); Cross
& Tiller, supra note 19, at 2159 ("The minority member may threaten to highlight the
disobedience externally to a higher court or to Congress, producing exposure and possible
reversal. Alternatively, the minority may expose the subconscious disobedience internally,
causing the majority to acknowledge its disregard or unintentional manipulation of
doctrine.").
35. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 33, at 155 (analyzing published
opinions); Cross & Tiller, supra note 19, at 2159; Revesz, supra note 24, at 1767.
36. CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLmcAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF
THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 18 (2006); see also Donald R. Songer et al., The Hierarchy of
Justice: Testing a Principal-Agent Model of Supreme Court-Circuit Court Interactions, 38
AM. J. POL. Sci. 673, 681 n.6 (1994) ("We limited our analysis to the published decisions in
part because .. . the problems of agency will be less important in unpublished cases.").
37. See Denise M. Keele et al., An Analysis of Ideological Effects in Published
Versus Unpublished Judicial Opinions, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 213, 215 (2009) ("By
analyzing published case decisions exclusively, judicial scholars ... may be drawing
conclusions . .. that do not accurately describe the motivational forces behind the majority of
judicial decisions."); Stephen L. Wasby, Unpublished Decisions in the Federal Courts of
Appeals: Making the Decision to Publish, 3 J. App. PRAC. & PROCESS 325, 330 (2001)
("[M]ost of the growing number of political scientists' studies of the United States Circuit
Courts of Appeals are based only on the sample of published opinions available in the new
Court of Appeals Database. This resource ... leads to a 'drunkard's search'-the drunk
looks for money not where it is dropped, but under the street light.").
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The remainder of the Article proceeds as follows. Part II
provides a brief background on the history and public debate of
unpublished opinions. Part ff1 lays out the theoretical framework for
strategic publication. Part IV describes the study's methods and data,
and Part V reports the results. Finally, Part VI discusses implications
for theory, policy, and future research.
II. UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
Historically, the federal circuit courts issued very few
unpublished opinions.38 But in the middle of the twentieth century,
the judiciary experienced a surge in caseload. As a result, judges
were required to write lengthy opinions in far more cases.39 And, in
turn, the growth in case law increased the "practical difficulty and
economic cost of establishing and maintaining accessible private and
public law library facilities."40
Unpublished opinions offered a solution to both problems. They
would take far less time to write because they would only apply to the
parties in the case and thus would not require a lengthy discussion of
the facts or law.41 They would also relieve libraries of the need to
maintain a copy of every judicial opinion because unpublished
decisions would have little precedential weight.42 Advocates also
argued that unpublished opinions would not stunt the development of
the common law because they would only be appropriate in cases
involving straightforward applications of existing precedent.43
Thus, the practice of unpublished opinions spread quickly.44
Since 1964 when the Judicial Conference first formally encouraged
38. See Donald R. Songer, Criteria for Publication of Opinions in the U.S. Courts of
Appeals: Formal Rules Versus Empirical Reality, 73 JUDICATURE 307, 308 (1990) ("It is not
known how many decisions of the courts of appeals were not published before 1964, but
apparently the number was relatively small."); Wald, Rhetoric of Results, supra note 8, at
1374 ("When I came onto the D.C. Circuit in 1979, we rarely if ever disposed of a criminal
appeal without an opinion; [by 1995,] we handle[d] 72% that way.").
39. See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., FJC RESEARCH SER. No. 73-2, STANDARDS FOR
PUBLICATION OF JUDICIAL OPINIONs: A REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON USE OF APPELLATE
COURT ENERGIES OF THE ADVISORY COUNCIL ON APPELLATE JUSTICE 5 (1973).
40. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 11 (1964).
41. See Wasby, supra note 37, at 333.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. The history of unpublished decisions in the federal circuits has been told and
retold many times before. For a detailed discussion, see Robert A. Mead, "Unpublished"
Opinions as the Bulk of the Iceberg: Publication Patterns in the Eighth and Tenth Circuits of
the United States Courts ofAppeals, 93 L. LIBR. J. 589, 590-95 (2001); Pether, supra note 8,
at 1442-73.
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judges to limit publication to opinions with "general precedential
value,"45 the circuit courts have experimented with a variety of
publication rules.46 Some, including the Third Circuit, have required
the approval of two judges to publish an opinion.47 Others allow the
authoring judge to decide.48 Most circuits have also established
specific criteria for publication, which may include whether the
opinion establishes new law, reverses the decision below, is
accompanied by a dissent or concurrence, creates a circuit split,
applies a rule to a new set of facts, involves an issue of public or legal
interest, or contains "a significant contribution to legal literature
through historical review or resolution of an apparent conflict."49 A
minority of circuits have provided significantly less formal
guidance.50
Recognizing that unpublished opinions could give an unfair
advantage to repeat players who have greater access to them, the
circuit courts also promulgated rules limiting citation to unpublished
opinions. Some circuits prohibited parties from citing unpublished
opinions as a source of law.s1 Others created an exception where "the
opinion ha[d] persuasive value on a material issue and no published
opinion ... would serve as well."52 But, subject to great controversy,53
45. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 40, at 11.
46. Mead, supra note 44, at 591.
47. HOOPER ET AL., supra note 32, at 92 ("[In the Third Circuit, a] majority of the
panel determines whether an opinion is designated as precedential or not precedential . . . .");
see also, e.g., 9TH CIR. R. 36-5 ("An order may be specially designated for publication by a
majority of the judges . . . ."); 11TH CR. R. 36 I.O.P. 6 ("A majority of the panel determine
whether an opinion should be published.").
48. See, e.g., 4TH CIR. LOCAL R. 36(a) ("Opinions ... will be published if the author
or a majority of the joining judges believes the opinion satisfies one or more of the standards
for publication .... ). But see 5TH CR. R. 47.5.2 ("An opinion will be published unless each
member of the panel deciding the case determines that i s publication is neither required nor
justified under the criteria for publication.").
49. HOOPER ET AL., supra note 32, at 157; see, e.g., 1sT CIR. R. 36(b); 4TH CIR. LOCAL
R. 36(a); 5TH CIR. R. 47.5; 9TH CIR. R. 36-2; D.C. CR. R. 36(c).
50. See, e.g., 11TH CIR. R. 36 I.O.P. 6 ("Opinions that the panel believes to have no
precedential value are not published.").
51. See, e.g., 1ST CIR. LOCAL R. 32.1.0 (noting that unpublished cases may be cited
but that the court will consider them "for their persuasive value but not as binding
precedent"); 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4 (describing "[u]npublished opinions issued on or after
January 1, 1996" as "not precedent" but allowing such opinions to be cited); 9m CIR. R. 36-3
(allowing the citation of unpublished dispositions, which are "not precedent," only in limited
circumstances); D.C. CIR. R. 32.1(b) (disallowing citation to unpublished orders issued before
a certain date as precedent).
52. 8TH CIR. R. 32.1A.
53. Judges, attorneys, scholars, and legal organizations submitted 504 comments on
the proposed rule, "the second-most ever submitted on a proposed amendment o a rule of...
procedure." Patrick J. Schiltz, Much Ado About Little: Explaining the Sturm Und Drang
Over the Citation of Unpublished Opinions, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1429, 1432, 1463
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the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure were amended in 2006 to
permit parties to cite any unpublished opinions issued after January 1,
2007.54 This change was motivated by the widespread availability of
unpublished opinions online today. The local rules described above
still govern citation of unpublished opinions issued before that date.ss
While unpublished opinions are a valuable tool to conserve
limited judicial resources, they have also been a source of
controversy.56 Critics have argued that the standards are too vague for
judges to apply them consistently.57 They have also argued that
unpublished opinions harm the development of the common law. In
doing so, they have pointed to empirical evidence that at least some
unpublished opinions should have been published,58 and they have
noted that "even routine cases may have fact patterns that are useful
(2005); see also Alex Kozinski, In Opposition to Proposed Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 32.1, FED. LAW., June 2004, at 36 (arguing against the proposed rule).
54. FED. R. App. P. 32.1 (a)(ii).
55. FED. R. App. P. 32.1 advisory committee notes to 2006 adoption.
56. See, e.g., Schiltz, supra note 53, at 1429 (stating, as the Reporter to the Advisory
Committee on the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, that "the issue of unpublished
opinions was the most controversial issue on the Advisory Committee's agenda" in the 1990s
and 2000s); id. at 1433 (reporting that one federal judge once said that talking to his
colleagues about unpublished opinions "was like trying to talk to them about sex or religion"
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
57. See Reynolds & Richman, supra note 8, at 1192 ("From the beginning there has
been some skepticism concerning judges' ability to distinguish correctly between dispute-
settling and lawmaking opinions."); Wald, Rhetoric ofResults, supra note 8, at 1374 ("[I]n
my experience the criteria are vague and infinitely maneuverable."); Edwin R. Render, On
Unpublished Opinions, 73 Ky. L.J. 145, 153 (1984-85) ("The 'precedential importance' of an
opinion ... cannot be predetermined by its author" because "[a] case that does not seem
particularly important today may become important in the future for reasons that are entirely
unknown to the court at the time the decision is made."); see also Songer, supra note 38, at
312-13 (showing significant variations in publication rates across judges in the same circuit).
58. See Reynolds & Richman, supra note 8, at 1193 n.135 (reviewing 100
unpublished opinions in the Fourth Circuit and concluding that "[s]everal appear to merit
publication"); Pamela Foa, Comment, A Snake in the Path of the Law: The Seventh Circuit's
Non-Publication Rule, 39 U. Prrr. L. REV. 309, 315-16 (1977) (finding that roughly one-fifth
of a sample of 150 unpublished orders from the Seventh Circuit merited publication); James
N. Gardner, Ninth Circuit's Unpublished Opinions: Denial of Equal Justice?, 61 A.B.A. J.
1224, 1226 (1975) (providing several examples of unpublished Ninth Circuit cases that
decided novel questions of law). But see Philip Shuchman & Alan Gelfand, The Use of
Local Rule 21 in the Fifth Circuit: Can Judges Select Cases of "No Precedential Value"?, 29
EMORY L.J. 195, 224 (1980) ("[T]he judges of the Fifth Circuit were in fact able to discern
which civil appeals could be summarily affirmed without great concern for the effect that the
omission of those opinions would have on the development of case law."). These studies rely
on the subjective evaluation of the authors. One exception is a study of publication decisions
in the district court, which surveyed attorneys in 330 district court cases. Susan M. Olson,
Studying Federal District Courts Through Published Cases: A Research Note, 15 JUST. SYS.
J. 782, 792 (1992). It reported that only 9% of cases that presented legal issues that were
"important for any broader social constituency [other] than [the] immediate client" were
published. Id.
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for litigants in similar situations."59 Critics have also contended that
the use of unpublished opinions encourages sloppy decision making
because judges devote far less time to thinking and writing about
them.60 And they have claimed that unpublished opinions harm
judicial accountability and transparency by dramatically decreasing
the probability of review and, in turn, reversal by a higher court.61 As
a result, judges can "hide inconsistencies in circuit doctrine" and
"avoid having to spell out the rationale of rulings."62
Some critics have also argued that non-precedential opinions are
unconstitutional.63 Most notably, in an opinion authored by Judge
Richard Arnold, the Eighth Circuit held ever-so-briefly that the
federal courts violate the separation of powers when they do not give
precedential weight to unpublished opinions.64 According to Arnold,
the framers understood that the "duty of courts to follow their prior
decisions ... derive[d] from the nature of the judicial power itself"
and was intended to "separate [judicial power] from a dangerous
union with the legislative power."65 Thus, he concluded, federal
judges exceed the limits of Article III when they ignore prior judicial
decisions, even unpublished ones.66 Sitting en banc, the Eighth
Circuit later vacated the opinion on mootness grounds but made clear
it was not deciding this constitutional question.67
The criticisms described above are reinforced by the circuit
courts' apparent fervor for unpublished opinions. Figure 1 displays the
percentage of merits cases in the federal circuit courts resolved by a
published opinion since 1985. In that year, published opinions
59. Mead, supra note 44, at 598.
60. See Reynolds & Richman, supra note 17, at 604-07; William Glaberson,
Caseload Forcing Two-Level System for U.S. Appeals, N.Y. TMEs, Mar. 14, 1999, at 1
("[Unpublished opinions are] sort of a formula for irresponsibility .... Most judges, myself
included, are not nearly as careful in dealing with unpublished decisions." (quoting then-
Chief Judge of the Seventh Circuit Richard Posner)).
61. See Patricia M. Wald, The Problem with the Courts: Black-Robed Bureaucracy,
or Collegiality Under Challenge?, 42 MD. L. REv. 766, 783 n.41 (1983) ("[Unpublished
opinions have] an obvious bearing on judicial accountability. Although unpublished
opinions may indeed save time, they limit the public's ability to evaluate the correctness of
judicial actions and give rise to uncertainties about the integrity of the courts."); see also
Mead, supra note 44, at 595-600 (reviewing the classic arguments against limited publication).
62. Wasby, supra note 37, at 328; see also Gardner, supra note 58, at 1224-25
(providing examples of doctrinal inconsistencies in unpublished cases in the Ninth Circuit).
63. See, e.g., Charles R. Eloshway, Note, Say It Ain't So: Non-Precedential Opinions
Exceed the Limits ofArticle HIPowers, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 632, 638-45 (2002).
64. Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 899-905 (8th Cir.), vacated as moot,
235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
65. Id. at 903.
66. Id. at 905.
67. Anastasoffv. United States, 235 F.3d 1054, 1056 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
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accounted for about 40% of cases.68 Since then, the publication rate
has fallen at a rapid and constant rate, and in 2015, the circuit courts
published in just 13% of cases.
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Figure 2, which breaks down the publication rate for each circuit
court from 1997 to 2015, reveals two additional trends. First, the
publication rate is low across the country. In every circuit in 2015, a
majority of cases were resolved through unpublished opinions. Seven
circuits-including the Third-had publication rates at or below 10%.
Another two had publication rates below 25%. The First, Seventh,
and D.C. Circuits each published at a higher rate but still resolved
more cases by unpublished opinions than published ones.
The second pattern is that since 1997 the publication rate has
decreased in every court but the D.C. Circuit. The First, Second,
Third, Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits experienced especially
68. The official data go back even further to 1981, and if the data is accurate, the
decline is even starker. See Michael Hannon, A Closer Look at Unpublished Opinions in the
United States Courts ofAppeals, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 199, 204-05 (2001). Indeed, the
Administrative Office of the Courts reported that the circuit courts published in 90% of cases
in 1981, far more than the 40% of cases they published in 1985. While the rapid drop in the
publication rate between 1981 and 1985 might reflect a real change in judicial practice, it
more likely represents a change in data collection procedures over time.
69. The data on 1997 to 2015 was obtained from reports issued by the federal courts.
See, e.g., Judicial Business of the United States Courts, USCOuRTS.Gov: STAT. & REP.
[hereinafter Judicial Business], http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/analysis-reports/
judicial-business-united-states-courts (follow "Judicial Business Report" hyperlink then
"Judicial Business Tables" hyperlink then "Type of opinion or Order Filed in Cases
Terminated on the Merits" hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 22, 2018). The pre-1997 data is from
Hannon, supra note 68, at 204. Data was not available for 1988-1990. See id. at 205.
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dramatic decreases. Taken together, these patterns provide little
evidence that the downward trend will not continue into the future.
Figure 2. Publication Rates for Merits Tenninations
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III. STRATEGIC PUBLICATION
Under the standard academic account of judicial behavior, a
circuit court panel that cannot agree on the outcome of a case has two
options. First, the judges can choose to express their sincere beliefs
by publishing a divided decision with a majority opinion and dissent.
Panels usually do not take this route,71 however, because a dissenting
70. The data were obtained from statistical reports issued by the federal courts for
1997 to 2015. See, e.g., Judicial Business, supra note 69.
71. See Songer, supra note 38, at 311 (finding that "virtually all of the decisions are
unanimous" in the Fourth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits); Daniel Hemel & Kyle Rozema,
Decisionmaking on Multimember Courts: The Assignment Power in the Circuits 15 (Univ. of








judge functions as a "whistleblower," dramatically increasing the
probability of reversal by spotlighting problems in a poorly reasoned
or ideologically extreme majority opinion.72 A dissent also increases
the time and resources required to write the majority opinion, which
typically responds to the dissent's objections.73 Thus, under the
standard view, the second and more common option is for the panel
members to engage in strategic bargaining: the majority agrees to
moderate the reasoning of the opinion in exchange for unanimity, and
the panel then publishes one opinion.74
Several empirical findings support the view that circuit court
judges frequently bargain over reasoning. To begin with, it is
relatively rare for a circuit court judge to file a dissent, even when
sitting alongside others with very different ideological views.75
Moreover, several studies have found that individual judges and
panels are more likely to vote inconsistently with their ideology when
the panel is ideologically diverse.76 Another study found that the
ideology of other judges on a panel are better predictors of the voting
behavior of a judge than his or her own ideology."7 And one study
further showed-based on the timing of circuit court decisions-that
these results are better explained by strategic bargaining than by
sincere changes in the judges' views of cases.78
I As Ricci shows, however, the standard academic account of
judicial behavior-in which the panel either publishes a divided
opinion or publishes a more moderate unanimous one-is incomplete.
The panel has a third option: strategic publication. It can resolve the
case without publishing the opinion and thus avoid establishing any
binding legal precedent. In other words, when the judges cannot
reach a compromise, they may exchange publication for unanimity.
https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2965880 (reporting that the dissent rate
in published opinions from the federal circuit courts ranged from roughly 1-2% from 1993 to
2007).
72. See Cross & Tiller, supra note 19, at 2169-70; see also George, supra note 21, at
267 (reporting that he odds of reversal for circuit court opinions with a dissent was thirty-
nine times higher than for unanimous opinions).
73. See supra note 22.
74. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
75. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
76. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 36, at 17-45; (finding that mixed panels
produce more moderate decisions); EPsTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 33, at 191; Cox
& Miles, supra note 23, at 25-29; Cross & Tiller, supra note 19, at 2170-72.
77. See Revesz, supra note 24, at 1767.
78. See Thomas J. Miles, The Law's Delay: A Test of the Mechanisms of Judicial
Peer Effects, 4 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 301, 304-05 (2012).
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There are sound theoretical reasons for panels to bargain over
publication. For the majority, the incentives are similar to the
incentives to bargain over reasoning: unanimity and non-publication
decrease the probability of reversal,79 and a unanimous unpublished
opinion takes far less time to write than a divided and published one.80
The minority judge also has an incentive to bargain over publication:
if she primarily cares about preventing the panel from establishing
undesirable precedent, she can achieve that outcome if the panel's
decision is not published.
The incentives to engage in strategic publication likely vary by
case, panel composition, and institutional context. Indeed, panels are
more likely to bargain over publication when the majority cares
relatively more about the outcome of the particular case before it and
the minority cares more about precedent.81 And the fear of reversal is
likely stronger when the ideology of the reviewing court is further
away from the majority.82
Aside from Ricci, what existing empirical evidence is there of
strategic publication? First, a number of judges have publicly
acknowledged that it happens. Perhaps most candidly, former D.C.
Circuit Judge Patricia Wald "s[aw] judges purposely compromise on
an unpublished decision incorporating an agreed-upon result in order
to avoid a time-consuming public debate about what law controls" and
also "s[aw] wily would-be dissenters go along with a result they d[id]
not like so long as it [was] not elevated to a precedent."83 Justice
Thomas recently wrote in dissent to a denial of certiorari that it was
"hard to imagine a reason that the Court of Appeals would not have
published [the opinion in the case] except to avoid creating binding
law for the Circuit."84 Other judges have also described the incentives
79. See Black & Owens, supra note 13, at 1071 (providing empirical evidence that
the Supreme Court is less likely to grant certiorari in cases disposed by unpublished
opinions); Wald, Changing Course, supra note 8, at 500-01 (noting that unpublished
opinions are "rarely en banced").
80. See Epstein et al., supra note 22, at 102 (finding that opinions accompanied by a
dissent are 20% longer).
81. Choi & Gulati, supra note 33, at 742.
82. See Morgan Hazelton et al., Sound the Alarm? Judicial Decisions Regarding
Publication and Dissent, 44 AM. POL'Y REs. 649, 651-54 (2016); discussion infra Part VI.
83. Wald, Rhetoric of Results, supra note 8, at 1374; see also Donna S. Stroud, The
Bottom of the Iceberg: Unpublished Opinions, 37 CAMPBELL L. REv. 333, 334-36 (2015)
(asserting that judges sometimes agree to sign onto an opinion they disagree with if the
opinion is not published).
84. Plumley v. Austin, 135 S. Ct. 828, 831 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) ("[T]he decision below is unpublished and therefore lacks precedential
force in the Fourth Circuit. But that in itself is yet another disturbing aspect of the Fourth
Circuit's decision, and yet another reason to grant review. The Court of Appeals had full
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to engage in strategic publication even if they did not report observing
it directly.85
Second, some unpublished decisions carry the hallmarks of
opinions that merit publication. A significant fraction of unpublished
decisions involve a reversal of the lower court.86 Moreover, some
unpublished opinions grapple with important, nonroutine, or difficult
questions of law.87 Indeed, as in published decisions, the outcomes of
unpublished decisions are often correlated with panel ideology.88 The
publication rates of judges within the same circuit also vary widely,
suggesting that judges do not apply publication rules consistently.89
And finally, there is evidence that one state intermediate appellate
court in the 1990s began publishing fewer of its reversals to "avoid
creating the impression that the trial courts were getting it wrong
briefing and argument on Austin's claim of judicial vindictiveness. It analyzed the claim in a
39-page opinion written over a dissent. By any standard . . . this decision should have been
published." (citation omitted)).
85. See, e.g., Arnold, supra note 31, at 223 ("If... a precedent is cited, and the other
side then offers a distinction, and the judges on the panel cannot think of a good answer to the
distinction, but nevertheless, for some extraneous reason, wish to reject it, they can easily do
so through the device of an abbreviated, unpublished opinion, and no one will ever be the
wiser .... Or if, after hearing argument, a judge in conference thinks that a certain decision
should be reached, but also believes that he decision is hard to justify under the law, he or
she can achieve the result, assuming agreement by the other members of the panel, by
deciding the case in an unpublished opinion and sweeping the difficulties under the rug.").
86. See Songer et al., supra note 30, at 975-76 (finding that 12% of unpublished
opinions in the Eleventh Circuit reversed the lower court and that more than a third of all
reversals appeared in unpublished opinions); Deborah Jones Merritt & James J. Brudney,
Stalking Secret Law: What Predicts Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals, 54
VAND. L. REV. 71, 107 (2001) (finding that 15% of the unpublished opinions in a sample of
National Labor Relations Board cases reversed the lower court).
87. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text; see also Stroud, supra note 83, at
357 (reporting that "[o]ne Fourth Circuit judge noted that 'hardly a week goes by without
finding an unpublished opinion that decides a matter of first impression"' (quoting an
anonymous survey response)).
88. See Songer et al., supra note 30, at 977 (finding evidence of ideological panel
effects in unpublished opinions from the Eleventh Circuit); Donald R. Songer & Reginald S.
Sheehan, Who Wins on Appeal? Upperdogs and Underdogs in the United States Courts of
Appeals, 36 AM. J. POL. Sci. 235, 250-251 (1992) (finding a broadly similar effect of panel
ideology in published and unpublished decisions); Merritt & Brudney, supra note 86, at 110
(finding that "judges with different backgrounds and demographic characteristics reach
different results" in a sample of unpublished decisions in NLRB cases); David S. Law,
Strategic Judicial Lawmaking: Ideology, Publication, and Asylum Law in the Ninth Circuit,
73 U. CN. L. REV. 817, 843 (2005) (finding evidence of ideological panel effects in
unpublished opinions from Ninth Circuit asylum cases). But see Keele et al., supra note 37,
at 232-33 (finding little evidence of ideological panel effects in unpublished United States
Forest Service cases).
89. Songer, supra note 38, at 312-13; see also Wald, Rhetoric of Results, supra note
8, at 1374 ("[I]n my experience the criteria are vague and infinitely maneuverable. In a study
of the D.C. Circuit's unpublished decisions several years ago, a bar committee . .. questioned
the decision not to publish in 40 percent of the cases.").
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more often than right."90 This example shows how the publication
decision can be influenced by "concerns unrelated to the true
publication-worthiness of the case at hand."91
Finally, there is some limited evidence that a circuit court panel
is less likely to publish a decision when its ideology is further from
that of the reviewing en banc circuit court.92
Not all published data supports the existence of strategic
publication, however. Two studies found no statistically significant
correlation between panel ideology and the publication decision.93 It
is difficult, however, to draw clear implications from their results. To
begin with, both papers studied narrow samples of cases-National
Labor Relations Board disputes in one and asylum disputes in the
other-which limits their generalizability to a broader swath of cases.
Both studies also relied on relatively small sample sizes. The reported
logistic regression model in the first paper estimated a relatively
substantial effect of panel ideology, but the estimates were not
statistically significant, at least in part due to the small sample of
about 500 cases.94 The sample size in the second paper was larger, but
the near-zero publication rate likely decreased the precision of its
estimates substantially.95 The remainder of this Article conducts a
direct test of strategic publication on a larger sample and broader
swath of cases.
IV. STUDY DESIGN
This Part describes the methods and data used to test for
evidence of strategic publication. The Third Circuit was chosen as the
study site for several reasons. First, as I explain below, my test of
strategic publication assumes that judges are randomly assigned to
panels. A recent article by Adam Chilton and Marin Levy found
90. Bert I. Huang & Tejas N. Narechania, Judicial Priorities, 163 U. PA. L. REV.
1719, 1726 (2015); see id. at 1742-46 (showing that, after the Illinois Supreme Court capped
the number of published opinions the intermediate appellate courts could issue per year, the
rate of published opinions reversing the lower court fell to the same rate of published
opinions affirming the lower court).
91. Id. at 1727.
92. See Hazelton et al., supra note 82, at 651-54.
93. See Law, supra note 88, at 861; Merritt & Brudney, supra note 86, at 106, 112.
94. Merritt & Brudney, supra note 86, at 80-81, 106 tbl.IX.
95. A publication rate of 4.7% for all-Republican panels, for example, yielded just
thirteen published opinions issued by all-Republican panels. See Law, supra note 88, at 832,
861. The paper did not provide information about he magnitude of the estimated effect or
the size of the standard error. See id at 862 (reporting only the p-value).
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evidence of nonrandom assignment in four of the twelve federal
circuit courts96 but found no such evidence in the Third Circuit.97
Second, to ensure random assignment of cases to panels, I need
to exclude opinions that were not issued by merits panels. My own
institutional knowledge of the Third Circuit was helpful in identifying
such opinions for exclusion.98 Moreover, among the eight remaining
circuits for which Chilton and Levy found no evidence of
nonrandomization, only the Third publishes historical calendar sheets
that indicate all cases assigned to full merits panels, including those
decided without oral argument. As I discuss below, this data is helpful
in assessing whether the right cases have been excluded.99
Finally, the Third Circuit is relatively typical of other circuits,
which strengthens the generalizability of my findings. For one thing,
the court is ideologically moderate. Indeed, for much of the study
period, Democrat-appointed judges held just over half of the active
seats in the court. For another, the court is typical in size: it has
fourteen authorized judgeships, just under the national average of
fifteen.100 The court's caseload is also typical both in terms of the
number and types of cases it decides.101 And, perhaps most
importantly, the Third Circuit's historical publication rate is relatively
typical of most other circuits.102
A. Analytic Strategy
My primary analytic strategy is to examine publication rates
across panels with different ideological compositions under the
standard assumption that ideological diversity increases the
probability of disagreement.103 I use the most common measure of
96. See Adam S. Chilton & Marin K. Levy, Challenging the Randomness of Panel
Assignment in the Federal Courts ofAppeals, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 39-40 (2015).
97. Id. at 40 ("For the ... Third [Circuit] ... we did not find any statistically
significant evidence of nonrandomness."); see also HOOPER ET AL., supra note 32, at 92 ("The
[Third Circuit] clerk randomly assigns all fully briefed counseled cases ... to three-judge
panels.").
98. I served as a clerk on the Third Circuit in the 2014-2015 term.
99. See infra Part IV.B.
100. Excluding the Ninth Circuit, which has twenty-nine judges, the average number
ofjudgeships is 13.6. See HOOPER ET AL., supra note 32, at 165.
101. See U.S. COURTS, TABLE B-1. U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS-APPEALS COMMENCED,
TERMINATED, AND PENDING, BY CIRCUIr, DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIOD ENDING MARCH 31,
2013 (2013), http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/b-1/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics/
2013/03/31.
102. See supra Figure 2.
103. See, e.g., Virginia A. Hettinger et al., Comparing Attitudinal and Strategic
Accounts ofDissenting Behavior on the U.S. Courts ofAppeals, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 123, 133
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judicial ideology-the political party of the judge's appointing
president. While scholars have developed other measures of ideology,
most notably judicial common space scores, they perform only
marginally better at predicting judicial decisions.104 I compare the
publication rates of panels with three Republicans; two Republicans
and one Democrat; one Republican and two Democrats; and three
Democrats. If judges and cases are randomly assigned to panels,105
then strategic publication predicts that panels will publish less
frequently if they are ideologically diverse than if they are
homogeneous.
B. Data
The vast majority of studies in the judicial behavior literature
have examined published opinions, primarily due to the lack of data
on unpublished decisions. In recent years, however, this problem has
diminished as the circuit courts have made far more of their
unpublished decisions available online. I downloaded 14,250
published and unpublished Third Circuit decisions from the
Government Printing Office (GPO) website, which receives the
documents from the United States Administrative Office of the Courts.
To analyze the opinions, I developed a series of regular expressions to
code the date of submission, whether there was oral argument, the
date of oral argument, the judges on the panel, whether the opinion
was published, and whether the case was criminal or civil in nature.06
Two additional variables raised special coding difficulties. First,
unlike some other circuits, the Third does not state the judgment (i.e.,
affirm, reverse, vacate) in capital letters at the end of each opinion. I
therefore developed a series of regular expressions to parse the
opinion for information on whether the panel affirmed the lower
court.10 7 As a validation check, I hand coded this variable in 100
randomly selected opinions-roughly half of them published, the
other half unpublished. In total, fifty-three of the fifty-four opinions
coded as an affirmance (98%) and thirty-five of the forty-two
(2004) ("[A]s th[e] ideological distance [between a judge and the majority opinion writer]
increases, the likelihood of writing a dissent likewise increases . . . .").
104. Joshua B. Fischman & David S. Law, What Is Judicial Ideology, and How
Should We Measure It?, 29 J.L. & POL'Y 133, 196 (2009).
105. See Chilton & Levy, supra note 96, at 40-41.
106. A case is coded as criminal if one of the parties is listed as "United States." All
other cases are coded as civil.




opinions coded as a non-affirmance (83%) were coded correctly.108
The regular expressions were unable to code 4 of the 100 hand coded
opinions (4%).109 Taken together, these results suggest that judgment
information was coded with reasonable accuracy.
Second, I created a variable to identify which opinions were
issued by merits panels. As is common in the federal courts, a
substantial number of cases are diverted to and decided by motions,
pro se, immigration, and other special panels.11o Because these
diverted cases are not pooled with merits cases for random
assignment, it is important to exclude them from the analysis. To
identify opinions issued by a merits panel, I computed the number of
opinions with oral argument or submission dates within a two-week
period by every judge-triad sitting together in the data.11 I then
labeled as merits cases any opinions issued by a two-week-triad that
issued five or more opinions and held at least one oral argument. Of
those cases, 233 were relabeled non-merits because they were (1) the
second opinion issued in the case, which is typically an amendment o
a prior opinion; (2) an order, which is rarely issued by merits panels in
the Third Circuit; or (3) an opinion clearly issued by an immigration
or pro se panel.
To confirm that this was a reasonable approach for identifying
opinions issued by merits panels, I collected calendar lists from the
Third Circuit website for the last six months of 2013, a period that
overlaps with my case-level data. The calendar lists identify all
cases-both those submitted on the briefs and those with oral
argument-for each merits panel. They provide some assurance that I
am reliably identifying merits cases. Indeed, of all 330 cases that I
identify as terminated by a full merits panel in the relevant period,
only three (1%) do not appear in the merits lists. And of all 386 case
numbers I identify as not terminated by a full merits panel, only fifty-
three (14%) are on a merits list.
After dropping all opinions that were not issued by a merits
panel, 5702 published and unpublished decisions remained in the
108. As a second validation test, I computed the affirmance rate for published and
unpublished opinions separately. The affirmance rate in unpublished opinions is 84%, while
the affirmance rate in published opinions is 45%, which is consistent with the view that
circuit courts are far more likely to issue reversals in published opinions. See Wasby, supra
note 37, at 338.
109. In the complete sample of cases, information on this variable was missing far less
often-in just 2% of cases.
110. See HOOPERETAL., supra note 32, at 87 (using the Third Circuit as an example).
111. In 1% of opinions, no dates for submission or oral argument were available.
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dataset.112 Table 1 shows the number of published and unpublished
opinions issued by merits panels by the year of submission or oral
argument. From 2008 to 2013, there were between 700 and 1100
opinions per year.113 Throughout that period, the publication rate
hovered around 17%.114
Table 1. Number of Opinions by Year of Submission
or Oral Argument, 2008-2013
Year Total Published Unpublished % Published
2008 1102 183 919 16.6
2009 1080 171 909 15.8
2010 966 171 795 17.7
2011 1013 169 844 16.7
2012 810 145 665 17.9
2013 731 130 601 17.8
All Years 5702 969 4733 17.0
V. RESULTS
A. Main Results
Strategic publication predicts that ideologically homogeneous
panels publish opinions more frequently than diverse panels. Each
column in Table 2 depicts the proportion of cases resolved by a
published opinion across the four possible panel compositions. The
numbers in parentheses indicate sample size. A dagger or star next to
a coefficient indicates that it is statistically significantly different from
the coefficient to its left.'15 The table reveals preliminary evidence of
112. I also excluded certain opinions based on other considerations: (1) opinions that
were perfect duplicates; (2) opinions submitted in or after 2014 to avoid temporal censoring;
(3) decisions with fewer than three judges; (4) opinions in which the precedential status was
unclear; and (5) opinions for which there was no submission or oral argument date.
113. It is unlikely that the decrease in opinions in 2012 and 2013 represents censoring
rather than an actual drop in issued opinions. First, sixteen months elapsed between the last
day of 2013 and May 2015, when the opinions were downloaded from the GPO website. It
is rare for a Third Circuit panel to take sixteen months after submission or oral argument to
issue an opinion. Second, if there were censoring in the 2012 and 2013 data, we would
expect the average date of submission or oral argument in opinions from those years in the
data to be earlier than the average date for prior years. Instead, the average dates are quite
similar. The average for 2008 to 2011 is 177.5, while the average date in 2012 was 175, and
the average date in 2013 was 182.3. Even if the decrease in opinions in 2012 and 2013
represents censoring, the results are substantively similar when those years are excluded from
the analysis. See Appendix Tables 1-2.
114. This rate is significantly higher than the rate depicted in Figure 2 because it
excludes cases diverted to pro se, immigration, and other panels.
115. All significance tests are two-sided t-tests.
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strategic publication: panels with two Republicans and one Democrat
publish just 15.1% of the time, while all-Republican panels publish
21.6% of the time. This difference, which is statistically significant at
the .01 level, implies that panels with three Republicans publish 43%
more often than panels with two Republicans and one Democrat. In
contrast, the publication rates for majority-Democrat panels were
stable. Panels with three Democrats and panels with two Democrats
and one Republican published roughly 17.5% of the time.
Table 2. Aggregate Publication Rate by Panel Composition
RRR RRD RDD DDD
All Cases 0.216 0.150** 0.175* 0.173
(787) (2465) (2120) (330)
Notes: t p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01
Table 3 disaggregates the publication rates for criminal and civil
cases. For both kinds of cases, the story is similar. For civil cases,
panels with two Republicans and one Democrat publish just 20.2% of
the time, while panels with three Republicans publish 26.7% of the
time. This means that all-Republican panels publish 32.2% more than
panels with two Republicans and one Democrat. The difference is
even starker for criminal cases, where panels with two Republicans
and one Democrat publish just 7.4% of the time, while panels with
three Republicans publish 14% of the time. All-Republican panels
thus publish 89.2% more in criminal cases than panels with two
Republicans and one Democrat.
Table 3. Aggregate Publication Rate by
Panel Composition & Case Type
RRR RRD RDD DDD
Civil 0.267 0.202** 0.232f 0.222
(472) (1473) (1243) (207)
Criminal 0.140 0.074** 0.096t 0.089
(315) (992) (887) (123)
Notes: tp<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01
I next examine the publication rate of individual judges across
panel compositions. Table 4 shows the publication rate for each
Democrat in the Third Circuit who issued at least thirty opinions from
each panel composition. Consistent with Table 1, the Democratic
judges published at relatively similar rates when on all-Democrat
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panels versus panels with one Republican judge. Compared to their
publication rates on all-Democratic panels, three judges published
more frequently with one Republican on the panel (Ambro, Sloviter,
Vanaskie), but none of the differences are statistically significant.
More importantly, six judges published less frequently on panels with
one Republican judge, but none of the differences are statistically
significant, and the differences for four of those judges are very small
(Barry, Greenaway, McKee, Rendell).
Table 4. Judge-Specific Publication Rate by
Panel Composition, Democrat Judges
Judge RRD RDD DDD
Aldisert 0.212 0.208 0.245
(33) (183) (49)
Ambro 0.171 0.171 0.156
(467) (449) (96)
Barry 0.097 0.117 0.127
(373) (428) (71)
Fuentes 0.186 0.171f 0.294
(376) (621) (34)
Greenaway 0.175 0.189 0.207
(228) (228) (82)
McKee 0.108* 0.165 0.182
(288) (474) (99)
Rendell 0.134 0.149 0.165
(298) (558) (91)
Sloviter 0.185 0.192 0.174
(216) (547) (195)
Vanaskie 0.133t 0.209t 0.133
(105) (302) (113)
Notes: tp<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01
Table 5 shows the publication rate for each Republican judge in
the Third Circuit with at least thirty opinions in each panel
composition. The results contrast starkly with the results for
Democratic judges. All but one of the Republican judges (Greenberg)
published more frequently on a panel with two other Republicans than
on a panel with one Democrat. The difference is statistically
significant for six judges at the 0.05 level, and for another one at the
0.1 level. And many of the effect sizes are very large. The relative
change is between 29-55% for five judges (Cowen, Fisher, Hardiman,
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Jordan, Smith) and between 60-100% for another three (Chagares,
Roth, Stapleton).
Taken together, the results in Tables 2 through 5 are consistent
with asymmetric strategic publication. While adding a Republican
judge to an all-Democrat panel in the Third Circuit had no effect on
the publication rate, adding a Democrat to an all-Republican panel
consistently reduced it.
Table 5. Judge-Specific Publication Rate by
Panel Composition, Republican Judges
Judge RRR RRD RDD
Chagares 0.197 0.121* 0.154
(228) (447) (364)
Cowen 0.222 0.172 0.054
(153) (122) (56)
Fisher 0.249 0.167* 0.179
(414) (568) (84)
Greenberg 0.237 0.242 0.233
(59) (194) (103)
Hardiman 0.215 0.142* 0.183
(242) (530) (240)
Jordan 0.217 0.159t 0.193
(277) (422) (296)
Nygaard 0.175 0.141 0.107
(97) (290) (75)
Roth 0.226 0.117* 0.190*
(115) (360) (232)
Scirica 0.174 0.15 0.143
(190) (427) (182)
Smith 0.215 0.157* 0.196
(270) (567) (225)
Stapleton 0.26 0.127* 0.186
(96) (79) (59)
Notes: tp<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01
B. Alternative Theoretical Mechanisms
There are at least two other potential explanations for these
results other than strategic publication. First, because Democratic
judges in the Third Circuit appear to publish slightly less frequently
than Republican judges,"16 it is possible that adding a Democrat to a
116. See supra Table 2.
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panel decreases publication not due to strategic publication but simply
because Democrats in the Third Circuit have a lower propensity to
publish. While I cannot fully rule out this alternative explanation, I
note that the general pattern of results is not consistent with its other
predictions. Indeed, if the propensity theory were right, we would
expect the publication rate to decrease as more Democrats are added
to the panel. But, as Table 2 shows, the publication rate for panels
with one Democrat is lower than the publication rate for panels with
two, and the publication rate for panels with two Democrats publish at
a similar rate to panels with three.
Second, if Democrats reverse less frequently than Republicans
and reversals generally merit publication, then adding a Democrat to a
Republican panel may decrease publication not through strategic
publication but by decreasing the probability of reversal.17 There are
two reasons to reject this alternative explanation. To begin with, the
premise is false. Majority-Democrat panels in the sample do not
reverse less frequently than majority-Republican panels. Indeed, as
Table 6 reveals, the affirmance rate across panel compositions is
statistically indistinguishable, and if anything, panels with more
Democrats affirm less frequently.
Table 6. Aggregate Affirmance Rate by Panel Composition
RRR RRD RDD DDD
All Cases 0.774 0.780 0.764 0.724
(787) (2465) (2120) (330)
Notes: t p<O.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01
Even more convincing, Table 7 attempts to control for the
outcome of the case by presenting publication rates for affirmances
and non-affirmances separately. As the table reveals, regardless of
case outcome, panels with two Republicans and one Democrat
publish substantially less frequently than all-Republican panels. Thus,
taken together, the pattern of results supports the theory of
asymmetric strategic publication.
117. See Law, supra note 88, at 861-63.
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Table 7. Aggregate Publication Rate by
Panel Composition & Judgment"8
RRR RRD RDD DDD
All Cases 0.216 0.150** 0.175* 0.173
(787) (2465) (2120) (330)
Non-Affirmance 0.457 0.370* 0.415 0.494
(175) (533) (492) (89)
Affirmance 0.147 0.090** 0.105 0.05 1*
(598) (1887) (1596) (234)
Notes: tp<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01
As one final robustness check, Table 8 presents the results of a
regression model of publication on each of the independent variables
and with fixed effects for year. All-Republican panels serve as the
baseline. Thus, unlike in prior tables, the coefficients and p-values for
each panel-composition variable are computed by reference to all-
Republican panels. The results confirm that, controlling for case type
and outcome, all-Republican panels publish more frequently than
panels with two Republicans and one Democrat. The difference
between panels with three Democrats and panels with two Democrats
and a Republican is not statistically significant. 19








Year Fixed Effects Yes
Notes: fp<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01
118. Sample sizes for the non-affirmance and affirmance rows do not add up to the
total because of missing data on the affirmance variable for ninety-eight cases.
119. For parsimony, the model for this result is not shown.
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VI. IMPLICATIONS & CONCLUSION
The evidence presented here suggests that federal circuit court
judges may engage in strategic publication quite frequently. Indeed, I
found that Third Circuit panels with three Republican judges
published far more frequently-roughly 43% more-than panels with
two Republican judges and one Democrat. These results are
consistent with the practice of strategic publication.
What explains the political asymmetry in the results? Why do
majority-Republican panels in the Third Circuit appear to engage in
strategic publication but not majority-Democrat panels? The most
plausible explanation is that Democratic judges held a majority of the
active seats in the circuit for nearly all of the study period. As a result,
majority-Republican panels may have perceived a higher chance of
reversal and thus had stronger incentives to trade publication for
unanimity. Majority-Democrat panels, by contrast, may have
perceived a lower chance of reversal and therefore had less incentive
to publish strategically.
Admittedly, the Supreme Court leaned conservative during the
study period, which might suggest that even the majority-Democrat
panels in the Third Circuit should publish strategically in fear of
reversal by that Court. But the composition of the en banc Third
Circuit may matter more because it reviews every published opinion
by the circuit and every unpublished opinion with a concurrence or
dissent.120 The Supreme Court, in contrast, only sees cases for which
a party files a petition for a writ of certiorari, and even then it has
stringent criteria for whether to grant plenary review. Additionally, the
judges on a given circuit panel have to sit on future panels with other
members of the en banc court. Thus, their relationships with fellow
circuit judges are at stake in each published opinion in a way that may
have no parallel with respect to their relationships with the Supreme
Court justices.121
120. See 3D CIR. I.O.P. 5.5.4 ("Drafts of not precedential opinions that contain a
dissent circulate to non-panel judges. ... Drafts of precedential opinions and not precedential
opinions that are not unanimous are circulated to all active judges of the court . . . .").
121. The empirical evidence regarding the relative importance of the en banc court
and the Supreme Court in predicting circuit court behavior is inconclusive. With respect to
the ideological outcome of the case, one study has found that the ideology of the en banc
court "influence[s] panel effects," while the ideology of the Supreme Court does not. See
Kim, supra note 27, at 1367-70. Another paper found that both the en banc court and the
Supreme Court have an effect. See Jonathan P. Kastellec, Hierarchical and Collegial
Politics on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 73 J. POL. 345, 356-58 (2011). With respect to the
probability of dissent, two papers have found that the ideology of the en banc court has no
effect. See Hazelton et al., supra note 82, at 667; Hettinger et al., supra note 103, at 132-34.
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In the next two subparts, I consider broader normative and
theoretical implications of my findings.
A. Policy Proposals
If strategic publication occurs frequently, then the practice may
have significant normative implications for the judiciary. Perhaps
most importantly, strategic publication would reinforce existing fears
that unpublished opinions impair judicial accountability by enabling
judges to insulate difficult or controversial decisions from judicial and
public scrutiny.122 It would also polarize circuit precedent. Indeed, if
diverse panels publish few decisions on controversial legal issues,
then those issues will be decided disproportionately by homogeneous
panels, which are more likely to write ideologically extreme opinions.
Several procedural reforms are available to diminish strategic
publication by pushing the publication decision to earlier phases in the
appellate process, before a panel has the chance to discuss and vote on
the merits of its cases. To begin with, a court could link the decision
to hold oral argument with the publication decision. Under this
system, when a panel decides to hold oral argument it would also
commit to issuing a published decision in the case. The problem, of
course, is that sometimes oral argument may be valuable, but a
published decision would not be (or vice versa). In these cases, it
would make little sense to require a panel to write a lengthy published
decision just so that it could hold oral argument. Indeed, over the last
few decades, oral argument has become much rarer in the federal
circuit courts, and there is little reason to encourage this trend
further.123
A second and better option is to rely on screening panels to make
an initial decision about publication. In many circuits, screening
panels of one or more judges are used to determine which cases
require oral argument.124 Cases that do are then assigned to full merits
One paper counterintuitively found evidence of an effect in the reverse direction. See
Hazelton et al., supra note 82, at 662-69. A final study found that the ideological
composition of the en banc court influenced the citations and treatment of prior precedents by
the panel. See Rachael K Hinkle, The Role of the U.S. Courts of Appeals in Legal
Development: An Empirical Analysis 45, 47-49 (May 2013) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Washington University), https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/etd/l 104/.
122. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
123. See David R. Cleveland & Steven Wisotsky, The Decline of Oral Argument in
the Federal Courts of Appeals: A Modest Proposal for Reform, 13 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS
119, 119-20 (2012) ("In 2011, only one quarter of all federal appeals were orally argued,
down from nearly two-thirds in the early 1980s...." (footnote omitted)).
124. See supra note 32.
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panels for adjudication. The circuit courts could require screening
panels to also flag cases for publication, which would attach a
presumption of publication.
Of course, as the appellate process unfolds the court will
sometimes learn new information that justifies revisiting the
screening panel's initial publication decision. Where the screening
panel deemed publication unnecessary, a merits panel should
generally be free to publish if it believes publication is merited. The
more complicated question concerns cases that are initially flagged
for publication, but the merits panel believes publication is
unnecessary. Perhaps the best solution would be to require the panel
to explain in its decision why the publication presumption has been
rebutted.
If this requirement does not create sufficient friction to
discourage panels from reversing the publication decision of
screening panels, a few other commitment mechanisms could help.
One option is to limit the kinds of reasons that are valid for reversing
the decision of the screening panel-for example, the reason must
constitute new information not available to the screening panel at the
time of its decision. Another option is for the clerk's office to
communicate to the parties that the case has been flagged for
publication at the same time they are informed whether the case will
receive oral argument. And one more possibility is to require the
panel to obtain approval from the screening panel in order to reverse
its decision regarding publication.
B. Understanding Judicial Behavior
Strategic publication also has important theoretical implications
for our understanding of judicial behavior. Empirical scholars of
judicial behavior have consistently found that diverse panels write
more moderate published opinions. Scholars have therefore
concluded that diversity promotes moderated reasoning, either by
changing how panel members view their cases or by incentivizing
strategic bargaining over reasoning. 125 Strategic publication calls that
interpretation into question, suggesting that he correlation between
panel composition and reasoning may represent selection rather than
causation. If judges engage in strategic publication, then published
opinions issued by diverse panels may be moderate not because
diversity moderates reasoning but because diverse panels issue
125. See supra note 34.
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ideologically extreme decisions in unpublished opinions, which are
excluded from most empirical work on judicial behavior.126
This selection process also has an important methodological
implication for empirical research on judicial behavior. For decades,
scholars of judicial behavior focused almost exclusively on published
decisions because unpublished ecisions were not widely available.
This methodological choice was justified by the belief that
unpublished decisions were simple, easy, and non-contentious, and
therefore, less worthy of study.127 Strategic publication suggests that
scholars should not ignore unpublished decisions any longer.128
126. See supra note 35.
127. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
128. See supra note 37.
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APPENDiX
Table 1. Aggregate Publication Rate by Panel Composition & Case
Type, Excluding 2012-2013
RRR RRD RDD DDD
All Cases 0.211 0.146** 0.168t 0.212
(592) (1830) (1555) (184)
Civil 0.265 0.199** 0.223 0.261
(366) (1105) (928) (119)
Criminal 0.124 0.066** 0.088 0.123
(226) (725) (627) (65)
Notes: fp<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01
Table 2. Aggregate Publication Rate by Panel Composition & By
































Notes: fp<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01
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